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PROTOKOL RFID UNTUK PENGESANAN
KEWUJUDAN SATU TAG RFID TUNGGAL DI
ANTARA DUA PEMBACA RFID
ABSTRAK
Terdapat batasan bagi pembaca RFID untuk membaca ribuan data yang disediakan oleh
tag RFID dalam sesaat. Oleh itu, konfigurasi pembaca RFID berbilang (multiple RFID reader)
diperlukan untuk menangani senario ini. Dalam aplikasi sebenar sistem RFID, terdapat banyak
konfigurasi untuk pembaca RFID dan tag RFID. Contohnya: tag RFID berbilang berkomu-
nikasi dengan satu pembaca RFID atau sebaliknya, tag RFID berbilang berkomunikasi dengan
pembaca RFID berbilang, dan pembaca RFID berbilang berkomunikasi dengan satu tag RFID
tunggal (single RFID tag). Untuk memastikan protokol rangkaian sedia ada (yang dibangunkan
oleh para penyelidik terdahulu bagi komunikasi dalam sistem RFID) boleh membantu dalam
apa jua jenis tag RFID dan konfigurasi pembaca RFID, maka satu ujian khusus diperkenalkan
dalam penyelidikan ini. Beberapa jenis pembaca RFID dan konfigurasi tag RFID digunakan
bagi mengesahkan kemampuan setiap protokol sedia ada untuk mengesan kewujudan tag RFID
tunggal dalam medan pembaca RFID berbilang. Berdasarkan analisis kami, terdapat dua jenis
protokol rangkaian yang digunakan untuk membuktikan kewujudan tag RFID berbilang, iaitu
tag bersandar dan tag bebas. Tag bersandar bergantung sesama sendiri untuk menjana kod
rahsia dan kod pengesahan. Bagi tag bebas, adalah sebaliknya. Kedua-dua jenis protokol ini
digunakan bagi mengesahkan kewujudan tag RFID dalam medan pembaca RFID berbilang,
dalam usaha menentukan keupayaan pengesanan mereka dalam sistem RFID. Secara tipikal,
tag RFID tunggal yang disahkan oleh konfigurasi pembaca RFID berbilang boleh digunakan
xi
dalam infrastruktur RFID pelbagai tujuan. Di sini, tag RFID tunggal diperlukan oleh pelba-
gai pembaca bagi tujuan yang berbeza dan pengesahan komunikasi di antara pembaca RFID
berbilang. Selain itu, kriptografi tak simetri seperti kriptografi keluk elips (eliliptic curve cryp-
tography) digunakan bagi menggantikan kriptografi simetri. Hal ini bertujuan melaksanakan
enkripsi data pada tag dan pembaca RFID dalam usaha menyediakan keselamatan perlindun-
gan yang tinggi terhadap serangan, di samping mengekalkan aplikasi kunci rahsia pada tag dan
pembaca RFID. Terdapat batasan dalam penyelidikan ini untuk menyelidik perkara ini dengan
lebih mendalam selain membuktikan keupayaan protokol rangkaian mengesan kewujudan tag
RFID tunggal dalam medan pembaca RFID berbilang, dan juga penambahbaikan keselamatan
perlindungan. Sebagai kesimpulan, adalah penting untuk memastikan bahawa protokol rangka-
ian yang dibangunkan bagi komunkasi dalam sistem RFID boleh berfungsi dengan pembaca
RFID dan konfigurasi tag RFID dalam usaha menyediakan suatu sistem yang boleh diharapkan
dan selamat kepada pengguna.
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A RFID PROTOCOL FOR DETECTING THE
EXISTENCE OF A SINGLE RFID TAG BY TWO
RFID READERS
ABSTRACT
There is a limitation for a RFID reader to read thousands of data provided by RFID tags in
a second. Hence, multiple RFID readers configuration is required to help resolving this sce-
nario. In real world applications of RFID system, there will be a lot of configurations for RFID
reader and RFID tag such as multiple RFID tag communicate with a RFID reader or vice versa,
multiple RFID tag communicate with multiple RFID reader and multiple RFID readers com-
municate with a single RFID tag. In order to ensure that existing network protocols which
developed by previous researchers for communication in RFID system can support in whatever
types of RFID tag and RFID reader configuration, a reliability and specific test through these
existing network protocols have been introduced in this research work. Several types of RFID
reader and RFID tag configuration will be used for verifying each of existing network proto-
cols ability for detecting a single RFID tag existence in multiple RFID readers field. Based on
our analysis, it is discovered that there are two types of network protocol used for generating
multiple RFID tag coexistence proof. They are named as tags dependent on each other’s output
network protocol and tags independent on each other’s output network protocol which used
to generate hash value and message authentication code. Via this research work, these two
types of network protocol are applied for authenticating a single RFID tag existence in multi-
ple RFID readers field in order to determine their ability to be used for authentication in RFID
system. Typically, a single RFID tag authenticated by multiple RFID reader configuration can
xiii
be used in a multi-purpose RFID infrastructure where a single RFID tag is interrogated by var-
ious readers for different purposes and verification of race communication in between multiple
RFID reader existence. Apart from that, an application of asymmetric cryptography such as
elliptic curve cryptography to replace symmetric cryptography for performing data encryption
on RFID tag and RFID reader helping to provide high security protecting to resist adversaries
attack as well as maintaining small length of secret key application on RFID tag and RFID
reader. There is a limitation for this research work to further enhance besides investigating on
each of multiple RFID tag coexistence proof’s network protocols ability for authenticating a
single RFID tag existence in multiple RFID readers field as well as security improvement. As
a conclusion, it is significant to ensure that network protocol developed for communication in
RFID system can work in whatever types of RFID reader and RFID tag configurations in order
to provide users a reliable and secure security monitoring system.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
RFID (Radio-Frequency Identification) tags are small, inexpensive microchips capable of trans-
mitting unique identifiers wirelessly over a short distance. Thanks to their ability in automating
supply-chain logistics, RFID tags promise eventually to supplant the optical barcode as a means
of identifying goods [12]. RFID system has been applied widely nowadays in many industries.
It is important for manufacturers to ensure that each of RFID tags can function and support
in different kinds of RFID reader configurations. RFID reader has limitation to read data sent
by a group of RFID tags per second. Hence, it is necessary to apply more than one RFID
reader to read data sent out by a group of RFID tags. It is common that a single RFID reader
is unable to cover the entire region of interest [27]. Before each of RFID readers or RFID
tags being applied in a complex network communication, manufacturers need to ensure that
network protocol that has been designed for communication is able to handle on both scenar-
ios which include a single RFID tag existence or multiple RFID tag coexistence authenticated
by different kinds of RFID reader configurations. Yoking Proof [12] which developed by Ari
Juels is a pioneer design used for proofing a group of RFID tags existence in a single RFID
reader field. It is widely applied in pharmaceutical distribution and manufacturing fields. More
detailed explanations are as follows:
• Pharmaceutical distribution: Suppose that there is a legal requirement for a certain
medication to be dispensed together with a leaflet describing its side-effects. One RFID
tag might be embedded in the container for the medication, while another is embedded
in an accompanying leaflet. A yoking-proof would provide evidence that each container
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of the medication was dispensed with a leaflet. It might be transmitted to, for example,
the U.S. FDA, for verification, or stored by a pharmacist as evidence in case of dispute.
• Manufacturing: Suppose that a manufacturer of aircraft equipment wishes to certify
that a certain part always leaves its factories with a safety cap attached. Given RFID tags
in both the part and the cap, a yoking-proof can provide third-party verifiable evidence
to support such certification [12].
There are many proposed works done for security improvement on Yoking Proof such as
Grouping Proof [24], Modified Proof [22] and Proof Proposed by Thiti et al. [19]. However,
there is a lack of research on existing network protocols which used to generate multiple RFID
tag coexistence proof. In this chapter, we are going to review each existing network protocol
ability for authenticating a single RFID tag existence in multiple RFID reader field. At first, let’s
go through some general steps of generating multiple RFID tag coexistence proof. The steps
are as follows:
1. Server sends a random number to RFID reader.
2. RFID reader deploys the random number sent out by server to its surrounding RFID tags,
and waits for RFID tags to generate hash value and message authentication code.
3. Once RFID reader receives hash values and message authentication codes generated by
RFID tags, it will submit these parameters for verification.
4. RFID tags, RFID reader and server share same secret key for generating and verifying
hash value and message authentication code.
As a short summary of this section, our point of view is network protocol developed for com-
munication in RFID system should be compatible in whatever types of RFID reader and RFID
2
tag configurations in order to let users have a secure and safe security monitoring system in
their daily applications.
1.1 Background Information
There are a lot of multiple RFID tag coexistence proofs which include Yoking Proof, Grouping
Proof, Modified Proof, Ordinal Authentication Protocols for RFID Tags and The Proof Pro-
posed by Thiti et al. have been introduced by previous researchers. All enhancements and
improvements done previously were about the security for preventing adversary attacks. Until
today, it is still a doubt whether these existing multiple RFID tag coexistence proof’s network
protocols could be applied in different kinds of RFID reader configurations for authenticating a
single RFID tag existence. To date, there is no research work done for resketching these existing
of network protocols under presence of multiple RFID readers field to determine their ability
for authenticating a single RFID tag existence. The reason that these network protocols are
proposed to test in multiple RFID readers field for authenticating a single RFID tag existence
application because it covers one of configurations in our daily applications on RFID system.
For example, various RFID readers query a RFID tag to retrieve information of interest for the
person or object whose identification information is stored in the tag where such application
of RFID system is known as multi-context RFID infrastructure [13]. The information of RFID
tag could be retrieved by multiple RFID readers at the same time for verification purpose if
multi-context RFID infrastructure is used. Another example is related to there is a possibility
for a RFID tag mobiles in surrounding RFID readers field where we will normally see this
application in supply chain management or manufacturing environments. Based on these two
examples, it shows that there is a necessity of application on multiple RFID reader configu-
ration to cover its interrogation region because each RFID reader has a limited interrogation
region within which it can communicate with a tag [27]. Thus, this research work has been
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carried out to ensure that existing of network protocols which used to generate multiple RFID
tag coexistence proof could be applied in whatever of RFID reader configurations for authen-
ticating a single or multiple RFID tag existence. Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 are the topologies
used for authenticating data in different configurations of RFID reader and RFID tag.
Figure 1.1: Topology for authenticating multiple RFID tags existence
Figure 1.2: Topology for authenticating a single RFID tag existence
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1.2 Problem Statement
Based on our finding, there are two types of network protocol applied for generating multiple
RFID tag coexistence proof. The types of network protocol are named as follows:
• Tags dependent on each other’s output network protocol - The protocol used to trans-
fer outputs generated by a RFID tag to other RFID tag via RFID reader as inputs for
generating message authentication code and hash value.
• Tags independent on each other’s output network protocol - The protocol is restricted for
communication among RFID tag and RFID reader. It can only be used for communica-
tion between RFID reader and RFID tag. All outputs generated by each RFID tag will
be directly submitted to RFID reader without sending it to other RFID tags.
Most of multiple RFID tag coexistence proofs apply tags dependent on each other’s out-
put network protocol for generating its proof, but unfortunately a problem occurs when tags
dependent on each other’s output network protocol is applied in multiple RFID readers field
for authenticating a single RFID tag existence. A single RFID tag existence in multiple RFID
readers field is unable to be detected by multiple RFID readers when tags dependent on each
other’s output network protocol is used for communication in this configuration. Based on
our analysis, tags dependent on each other’s output network protocol requires at least a pair of
RFID tag existence in multiple RFID readers field in order to enable RFID readers detecting
both RFID tags existence. With current existing of network protocols developed by previous
researchers which used for generating multiple RFID tag coexistence proof such as Yoking
Proof, Grouping Proof, Modified Proof by S. Piramuthu and Ordinal Authentication Protocols
for RFID Tags, a single RFID tag is unable detected by RFID readers when a tag is located
within multiple RFID readers field. However, network protocol which developed by Thiti et al.
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is the only one that can be used in multiple RFID readers field for detecting a single RFID tag
existence. Even though, Thiti et al. has resolved network protocol issue that causes a flaw on
authentication in RFID system, there is a security issue needed to be improved during authen-
tication between RFID tag and RFID reader. In order to resolve the security issue, a solution
has been proposed via this research work by introducing application of asymmetric cryptog-
raphy such as elliptic curve cryptography to replace symmetric cryptography which has been
applied in existing of multiple RFID tag coexistence proofs for performing data encryption
and verification. The purpose of asymmetric cryptography is proposed to replace symmetric
cryptography used for generating multiple RFID tag coexistence proof due to asymmetric cryp-
tography’s ability to prevent secret key being eavesdropped during authentication is on going
between sender and receiver, and indirectly server does not need to manage a large quantity
of secret keys if a public key is used by a group of RFID tags. It helps to save time during
key management process. As a summary, elliptic curve cryptography is identified suitable to
replace symmetric cryptography for performing data encryption in RFID system because its
private key remains private and the size of the secret key being used is small. Besides that,
it helps to prevent replay attack occurs during authentication data process happening between
RFID reader and RFID tag because adversary does not know secret key stored on each sender.
1.3 Research Motivation
It is important to ensure that a single RFID tag existence and multiple RFID tag coexistence are
able to be detected by different kinds of RFID reader configurations by using the same network
protocol. In our daily applications of RFID system, there might be a configuration of a single
RFID tag being authenticated in multiple RFID readers field. Typically, such configuration can
be seen when a single RFID tag information is interrogated by various readers for different
purposes, in supply chain and manufacturing environment. Thus, it becomes a motivation of
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this study to come out with a completed research work to ensure that network protocols have
been developed by previous researchers for authenticating multiple RFID tags coexistence in a
single RFID reader field are able as well applied for authenticating a single RFID tag existence
in multiple RFID readers field.
In order to prove that tags dependent on each other’s output network protocol causes a flaw
when it is applied in multiple RFID readers field for authenticating a single RFID tag existence,
some figures have been drawn to show their disability behaviour. With application of asymmet-
ric cryptography, verifier needs to go through some difficult processes of solving factorize or
complexity equations before it can view the actual data enlightening us on how to improve
security performance during process of authentication data in RFID system. These two scenar-
ios discussed above have motivated this study to provide a solution for solving security issues
R1
R2 R3
S1
S2
S3
Tag
Figure 1.3: Topology of multi-propose RFID infrastructure
which occur on existing proofs and making a decision on type of network protocol being used
for authentication in RFID system. Based on article [13], it stated that there is a possibility for
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a single RFID tag being authenticated by various RFID readers for different purposes whereby
the authentication process occurs at the same time or vice-versa. Hence, it is important to make
sure that existing network protocols which are used to authenticate multiple RFID tag exis-
tence in a single RFID reader field can be used to authenticate a single RFID tag existence in
multiple RFID reader field. In figure 1.3, it shows an example of topology for multi-propose
RFID infrastructure which is used to authenticate information stored in a RFID tag by multiple
RFID reader. RFID readers R1,R2,R3 are used to read information stored in a RFID tag simul-
taneously while server S1,S2 and S2 are databases used to verify each information submitted
by RFID readers R1,R2,R3. The configuration of RFID system in such manner is useful on
application of issuing a visa to a citizen. When an individual wants to apply a visa from visa
department, he or she just needs to stand in front of counter of application visa,counter of police
department and counter of bank department by holding RFID tag to let RFID reader on each
department checks the information contained in a RFID tag. The purpose of scanning infor-
mation which contained in a RFID tag simultaneously by multiple RFID reader as mentioned
on above scenario is to track a record on an individual before visa department proceed with
issuing a visa to an individual. If an individual has a criminal record or bad financial record
from police department or bank department, server from police department or bank department
will directly send a record to server which is used on visa department. Thus, visa department
Table 1.1: Representative of each device in figure 1.3
Device Department
RFID reader R1 Police
RFID reader R2 Visa
RFID reader R3 Bank
Server S1 Police
Server S2 Visa
Server S3 Bank
will not approve a visa applied by particular individual if there is any bad records provided by
server from police department or bank department. With multiple RFID readers authenticating
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information stored in a RFID tag, it facilitates visa department to track a record on an individual
and expedites a process of approving a visa to a citizen.
1.4 Objectives of Research
The objectives of this research work are stated as follows:
• To unify network protocol used for authentication data in RFID system .
• To propose application of asymmetric cryptography such as elliptic curve cryptography
for performing encryption and decryption data on RFID tag used for authentication.
• To compare security performance on applications of symmetric cryptography and asym-
metric cryptography for authenticating data in RFID system.
• To describe on existing network protocols’ characteristics which are used for generating
multiple RFID tag coexistence proof.
1.5 Scope and Limitation
The research scope of this study is mainly focusing on network protocols which are used for
generating multiple RFID tag coexistence proof. Two types of network protocol have been iden-
tified from this study being used for generating multiple RFID tag coexistence proof. Hence,
these network protocols are tested for authenticating a single RFID tag existence in multiple
RFID readers field in order to ensure that these two types of network protocol can be used
in different kinds of RFID reader and RFID tag configurations for authenticating data pur-
pose. Besides that, an application of asymmetric cryptography for performing encryption data
on RFID tag requires a study and understanding on algorithms of asymmetric cryptography
before it can be used on our proposed scheme. As a short summary, the scope of study for this
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research work includes understanding of elliptic curve cryptography algorithm, understanding
on each characteristic of existing network protocols which is used to generate multiple RFID
tag coexistence proof and possibility of attacks encountered by RFID tag, RFID reader and
server during data transmission over the air. However, this research work has its own limitation
to perform development and enhancement. But, it is important to reveal the existing network
protocols’ ability in performing authentication in RFID system. This study is beneficial to
those who are interested in designing of network protocol for communication and application
of asymmetric cryptography for verification data in RFID system.
1.6 Organization of Thesis
The remainder of chapters are organized as follows:Chapter 2: Theoretical background and
literature review on existing proofs,Chapter 3: Analysis and proposed scheme,Chapter 4:
Discussion of security analysis and Chapter 5: Conclusion and future research.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND
LITERATURE REVIEW FOR EXISTING PROOFS
Many types of development have been proposed by researchers for generating multiple RFID
tag coexistence proof such as Yoking Proof [12], Grouping Proof [24], Modified Proof by S.
Piramuthu [22], Ordinal Authentication Protocols for RFID Tags [16] and The Proof Proposed
By Thiti et al [19]. In this chapter, we are going to review each of network protocols which has
been developed for generating multiple RFID tag coexistence proof and theoretical background
of these existing proofs. Before we are going to review each of the proofs, let’s review RFID
tag features at a glimpse.
2.1 Types of RFID tag
Nowadays, there are three main types of RFID tag available in market. The types are as follows:
• Passive RFID tag - Passive RFID tags have no internal power supply. However, a small
electric current is created in the antenna when an incoming signal reaches it. This current
provides enough power to briefly activate the tag, usually just long enough to relay simple
information, such as an ID number or product name. Because passive RFID tags do not
contain a power supply, they can be very small in size, sometimes thinner than a piece
of paper. These tags can be activated from a distance of ten millimeters to over 6 meters
away.
• Active RFID tag - Active RFID tags do contain an internal power source, which allows
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for a longer read-range and for a bigger memory on the tag itself. The power source
also makes it possible to store information sent by the transceiver. Active RFID tags are
larger than passive tags, usually slightly bigger than a coin. They can be read from many
meters away, and generally have a battery life of about ten years. Advantages of active
tags include accuracy, reliability, and superior performance in adverse environments,
such as damp or metallic.
• Semi-Passive RFID tag - The tag uses an internal power source to monitor environmental
conditions, but it needs RF signal from RFID reader to power it up. Typically, an external
power source is used to extend tag’s signal strength and monitoring environmental con-
dition such as temperature and shock. The rest of characteristics are similar with passive
RFID tag.
Radio frequency which is used for communication in between RFID tag and RFID reader can
be divided into four categories such as:
1. Low frequency tags 125 or 134.2 kHz
2. High frequency tags 13.56 MHz
3. UHF 868 to 956 MHz
4. Microwave tags 2.45 GHz
2.1.1 RFID Applications
There are wide applications of RFID system in different kinds of field. The examples are as
follows:
• Medical: Tags are placed on prescription pill bottles for the visually impaired. A spe-
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cial reader provides audible information on the name, instructions and warnings of the
prescription.
• Animal Identification: Low frequency tags are implanted in animals, wild or domestic,
which can be read to provide information such as gender, name, diseases etc. These tags
also allow lost pets to be returned to their owners.
• Tracking: High frequency RFID tags are used to track library books, baggage, ID tags,
warehouse inventory and even credit cards. American Express has a new service called
Express Pay, featured on the American Express Blue credit card, which utilizes RFID
technology.
• Geology/Vulcanology: RFID transceivers relay seismic information to specialized read-
ers, greatly simplifying the collection of data.
• Automotive: Michelin has spearheaded a program to embed RFID tags in their tires.
This will help track down problems should a recall have to be utilized. In addition, some
Toyota and Lexus models feature a Smart Key option, which uses an active RFID tag to
allow the driver to unlock doors and roll down windows without having to take the key
out of their pocket.
2.1.2 Classes of RFID Tag
There are six classes of RFID tag available in market nowadays. The classes of RFID tag can
be classified as Class 0,Class 1,Class 2,Class 3,Class 4 and Class 5. Each class has its own
specific read and write capability. The descriptions on each type of classes are as follows:
• Class 0 - Only can be used to be preprogrammed on passive tag and read only. Used in
UHF band.
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• Class 1 - The tag can only be used to write once and read for many times. Used in UHF
and HF band.
• Class 2 - Passive RFID tag that can be used to read and write for many times.
• Class 3 - The tag can be read and written on board sensor used to record parameters such
as temperature,pressure, and motion. It can either be semipassive or active RFID tag.
• Class 4 - Read and write active RFID tag with integrated transmitter. It can be used to
communicate with other RFID tag and RFID reader.
• Class 5 - It is similar to class 4 RFID tag, but it has additional function which is used to
power up other RFID tag and RFID reader.
2.1.3 Using Elliptic Curves on RFID Tags
RF-Interface
Control Logic
RAMEEPROMALU
Antenna
Figure 2.1: RFID Tag Architecture
Based on article [1], Siemens AG, Coporate Technology has introduced a RFID tag which
uses Elliptic Curve cryptography for encrypting and decrypting data as shown in Figure 2.1.
The architecture of RFID tag comprises control logic, read access memory (RAM), electri-
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cally erasable programmable read only memory (EEPROM),arithmetic logic unit (ALU) and
antenna. There is a simulation on gate count of the elliptic curve unit done by [1] in their
research work, whereby they have implemented elliptic curve hardware in VHDL on Xilinx
Spartan 3 FPGA. As a result of simulation, the synthesis tool had counted 18121 gates com-
puted in different components on RFID tag. Nowadays, it is possible to use RFID tag which
applies elliptic curve cryptography for performing encryption and decryption data to generate
multiple RFID coexistence proof since Siemens has already invented it. Table 2.1 has shown
that number of logic gates required in [1]’s design on RFID tag. According to [1]’s report, the
tag requires only 64ms to perform scalar multiplication with a 163 scalar bits when a clock of
5MHz and an elliptic curve over the field GF(2163) are used. Table 2.2 shows each component
functionality on architecture of RFID tag designed by [1].
Table 2.1: Gate count of the elliptic curve unit [1]
Component Gate equivalent
Arithmetic Unit 4548
Memory 11205
Control Logic 2368
Table 2.2: Function of each component on RFID tag designed by [1]
Component Function
Arithmetic Unit computes additions and multiplications
in the finite field over which the elliptic
curve is defined
Control Logic implements the scalar multiplication of
points on the elliptic curve and the
cryptographic protocol of the applica-
tion
Memory contains volatile intermediate results of
the point arithmetic and non-volatile
system parameters and keys
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2.2 Theoretical Background for Generating Multiple RFID Tag Co-
existence Proof
Basically, the process of generating multiple RFID tag coexistence proof involves a server,
RFID reader and a group of RFID tags. The main function of server or verifier is to generate
a random number or timestamp to a group of RFID tags and verify hash value and message
authentication code submitted by RFID reader. Meanwhile, RFID reader is used as a medium
to transmit random number or timestamp received from server to a group of RFID tags. Besides
that, RFID reader is applied to read hash value and message authentication code generated by
each of RFID tags. Once RFID reader has read all hash values and message authentication
code values generated by its surrounding RFID tags, it will submit collected parameters to
server for verification. Each of RFID tags applies random number or timestamp generated by
server as one of the inputs to generate hash value and message authentication code value. There
are two main theoretical cryptography applications involved for generating multiple RFID tag
coexistence proof which include hash function and message authentication code. Hash function
is applied for converting large bits of random number sent out by server to a fixed size of hash
value. If adversary tries to change or modify the data during its transmission in the air, it would
cause the hash value to change. Hence, server or verifier is able to detect the hash value’s
status when it has been tempered or modified by an adversary. On the other hand, message
authentication code is used to authenticate the message that has been compressed to fixed size
of data. Once a large bits of random number being sent out by server, RFID reader and RFID
tag will apply hash function to compress that particular block of random number becoming a
fixed size of data or known as hash value. Next, the hash value will be computed into MAC
function for generating a short piece of information which is known as MAC value and it will
be sent for authentication.
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2.3 Cryptography Hash Function
A cryptographic hash function is a deterministic procedure that takes an arbitrary block of
data and returns a fixed-size bit string, cryptographic hash value, such that an accidental or
intentional change to the data will change the hash value [5]. The data to be encoded is often
called the "message", and the hash value is called message digest or simply digest [5].
The ideal cryptographic hash function has four main properties:
• it is easy to compute the hash value for any given message
• it is infeasible to find a message that has a given hash
• it is infeasible to modify a message without changing its hash
• it is infeasible to find two different messages with the same hash
Existing multiple RFID tag coexistence proofs apply hash function to generate hash value
with a random number sent out by server as an input. Each of RFID tags applies different secret
key for encrypting the plain text. The purpose of hash function being used in multiple RFID tag
coexistence proof is to fix of random number size and prevent actual data reveal by adversary
[21]. Previous researchers have chosen hash function for encrypting data because it is able to
withstand all known types of cryptanalytic attack. A strong cryptographic hash function must
constitute at least three minimum properties:
• Preimage resistance: Given a hash h it should be hard to find any message m such that
h = hash (m). This concept is related to that of one way function. Functions that lack this
property are vulnerable to preimage attacks [5].
• Second preimage resistance: Given an input m1, it should be hard to find another input,
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m2 (not equal to m1) such that hash (m1) = hash (m2). This property is sometimes referred
to as weak collision resistance. Functions that lack this property are vulnerable to second
preimage attacks [5].
• Collision resistance: It should be hard to find two different messages m1 and m2 such
that hash (m1) = hash (m2). Such a pair is called a (cryptographic) hash collision, and this
property is sometimes referred to as strong collision resistance. It requires a hash value
at least twice as long as what is required for preimage-resistance, otherwise collisions
may be found by a birthday attack [5].
2.4 Message Authentication Code (MAC)
In cryptography, a message authentication code is a short piece of information used to authen-
ticate a message [23]. A MAC algorithm, sometimes it is being called a keyed (cryptography)
hash function, accepted as input a secret key and an arbitrary length message to be authenti-
cated, and output a MAC (sometimes known as a tag)[23]. The MAC value protects both a
message’s data integrity as well as its authenticity, by allowing verifiers (who also possess the
secret key) to detect any changes on message content. MAC value is generated and verified
by using same secret key [26]. Hence, sender and receiver must agree on the same secret key
before they can initiate a communication [26]. Existing multiple RFID tag coexistence proofs
apply message authentication code MAC as a short piece of information for verifying hash
value. The server shares the same secret key with authorized RFID tags and applies it for re-
generating and verifying hash value and MAC value received from RFID tags. Figure 2.2 shows
that how MAC value is generated and authenticated by server. Besides that, it also shows that
sender and receiver possess the same secret key for encrypting and decrypting data. Once the
process of key agreement in between sender and receiver is successful,sender starts to compute
a message into MAC function for generating MAC value with application of a secret key. Af-
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Figure 2.2: Example of how MAC value is generated and authenticated
ter MAC value is generated, sender will forward the MAC value to receiver. When receiver
receives the message and MAC value generated by sender, it will apply MAC function, re-
ceived message and its secret key to regenerate that particular MAC value again before making
a comparison to determine its validity.
2.5 Symmetric Cryptography
The general idea on how symmetric cryptography works is sender and receiver each has the
same secret key for authentication before it is used for performing encryption data. All existing
of multiple RFID tag coexistence proofs are applied hash function to generate fixed size of data,
while applying MAC function for generating a short piece of information with hash value as
one of the inputs. When symmetric cryptography is used for generating multiple RFID tag co-
existence proof, server possess all secret keys (xa,xb,xc,xd) which belonged to authorized RFID
tags. The purpose of symmetric cryptography being applied for generating multiple RFID tag
coexistence proof is to ensure that only authorized RFID tag can generate a similar MAC value
and hash value with server [26]. With the application of symmetric cryptography, server will
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be able to detect data which submitted by unauthorized RFID tag [10]. But there is a disadvan-
tage when applying symmetric cryptography for performing encryption and verification data
because the secret key is easily eavesdropped by an adversary during secret key agreement
process in between sender and receiver. Thus, asymmetric cryptography has been proposed to
replace symmetric cryptography via this research work for resolving security issues that exist
on existing multiple RFID tag coexistence proof. Anyhow, there is one advantage of using
symmetric cryptography whereby it only requires small length of secret key to store in RFID
tag which makes the process of encryption faster compared with application of asymmetric
cryptography.
Server
(Xa,Xb,Xc,Xd,…)
Tag A
(Xa)
Tag B
(Xb)
Tag C
(Xc)
Tag C
(Xd)
Reader
Identical Secret Keys
Figure 2.3: Symmetric cryptography
2.6 Asymmetric Cryptography
Figure 2.4 shows a brief idea on how asymmetric cryptography can be applied for perform-
ing encryption and decryption data on RFID tag and RFID reader, and the way on how it
works. Each of RFID tags (A, B, C, D) applies public key (E) for encrypting random number
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or timestamp sent by server, while server applying its private key (Ps) for decrypting cipher
texts generated by RFID tags. Besides that,server applies all public keys which submitted by
RFID tags (EA,EB,EC,ED) for verifying each of RFID tag’s digital signatures. Even though
symmetric cryptography consumes less computing power, in terms of security performance,
asymmetric cryptography is more reliable because an adversary cannot directly apply public
key that it receives from server to construct a cipher text and submitted for verification. Hence,
it is very hard for an adversary to forge the data or act as an authorized verifier because only
sender knows its own private key, and it is impossible for any other devices to forge the pri-
vate key from sender [8]. There are few types of asymmetric cryptography methods that have
been introduced to date such as RSA cryptosystem, Rabin cryptosystem, ElGamal cryptosys-
tem and Eliptic Curve cryptosystem. RSA algorithm is based on difficulty to factor a large
integer composed of two or more large prime numbers, while Rabin crytosystem deals with
quadratic congruence whereby decryption of the message is infeasible if two private keys are
unknown. ElGamal cryptography is based on difficulty to solve discrete algorithm while ellip-
tic curve cryptography is based on difficulty of solving elliptic curve logarithm problem [27].
Basically, RSA and Rabin cryptosystem require at least 1024 bits of secret key to achieve same
security level with symmetric cryptography which uses only 80 bits of secret key. On the other
hand, Elliptic Curve cryptography requires only 160 bits of secret key to achieve same security
level with RSA, Rabin cryptosystem and symmetric cryptography. Based on Table 2.3, we can
Table 2.3: Key sizes in bits for equivalent levels [20]
Symmetric Key Size Security (bits)
80 112 128 192 256
RSA 1024 2048 3072 8192 15360
ECC 160 224 256 384 512
conclude that elliptic curve cryptography is suitable to use for authentication event in multiple
RFID tag coexistence scenario because it only requires 160 bits of secret key to perform en-
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Figure 2.4: Asymmetric cryptography
cryption and decryption data on RFID tag and RFID reader. Nowadays, Siemens Technology
has manufactured RFID tag which uses asymmetric cryptography to operate. Hence, it is pos-
sible to apply asymmetric cryptography in performing authentication in RFID system provided
that the users are willing to pay more. In order to prove that there is a possibility to implement
elliptic curve cryptography on passive RFID tag, a table of synthesis result and performance
prepared by [17] is shown below. Based on information provided in table 2.4, if elliptic curve
Table 2.4: Synthesis result and performance [17]
PKC Area(gates) Freq(KHz) Perf(msec) Power(µW)
ECC GF(2163)
12506 1,130 244.08 36.63
14064 590 245.49 21.55
14729 411 246.19 15.75
15356 323 243.17 12.08
cryptography is implemented on RFID tag by using CMOS 0.13 µm technology, there will
be less logic gates are required for running the operations of general modular operation and
point multiplication compared with the work proposed by [1]. The research work done by [17]
has helped to reduce the number of logic gates applied for operating elliptic curve cryptogra-
phy. The specifications of RFID tag and RFID reader being used for this research work are as
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follows:
• Number of Logic Gates - 12506
• Operating Frequency - 1,130 KHz
• Power consumption - 36.63 µw
• Class 2 of RFID tag
The reason that we select CMOS 0.13 µm technology proposed by [17] for operating elliptic
curve cryptography is because less of logic gates are required and it is suitable to apply on low
cost RFID tag which operates in low frequency. Besides that, Class 2 of RFID tag being used is
to allow user to program and erase the information of secret key when there is a need to change
the secret key stored in RFID tag.
2.6.1 Diffie-Hellman key exchange for elliptic curves cryptography
In application of asymmetric cryptography, prior sender and receiver can use each other’s pub-
lic key to perform encryption and decryption data, there will be a key agreement process needed
to go through by sender and receiver. Below are small examples on the process of how key
agreement for elliptic curve is achieved between sender and receiver. This example is picked
up from [6].
• Alice and Bob agree on an elliptic curve E over a finite field Fq so the discrete logarithm
problem is hard in E(Fq).
• They also agree on a point P ∈ E(Fq) such that the subgroup generated by P has large
order (usually prime).
• Alice chooses secret integer, a, computes Pa = aP and sends Pa to Bob.
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• Bob chooses secret integer, b, computes Pb = bP and sends Pb to Alice.
• Alice computes aPb = abP . Bob computes bPa = abP .
• Alice and Bob agree on a method to extract a key from abP .
• In order to break the encryption, eavesdropper needs to know secret keys (a,b) which be-
longed to Alice and Bob. Therefore, eavesdropper needs to solve Diffie-Hellman prob-
lem for elliptic curves.
2.6.2 Theory of Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Basically, authentication event in RFID system requires secure and privacy channel to avoid
adversary attack. But, with an application of symmetric cryptography it doesn’t achieve the
security level that asymmetric cryptography can perform. Hence, we have proposed appli-
cation of asymmetric cryptography to generate cipher text in multiple RFID tag coexistence
proof instead of using symmetric cryptography. Anyhow, in view of RFID tag has limitation
of capacity to store a data, a proper review on which type of asymmetric cryptography is suit-
able to be used on RFID tag is one of the necessities to ensure that number of logic gates
implemented on RFID tag are comparable with number of secret key bits being used. Among
the four types of asymmetric cryptography,elliptic curve cryptography is identified as the most
suitable to be used as algorithm for encryption and decryption data on wireless communication
devices due to it applies smaller amounts length of secret key compared to others asymmetric
cryptography. Some descriptions of elliptic curve algorithm are as follows:
• Elliptic curve cryptography involves elliptic curves over a finite field. There are two types
of field such as prime fields GF(p) and binary finite fields GF(2m).
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